This article critically analyses the use of the persistent objector doctrine in unilaterally challenging the validity of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) rights and the related state obligations. The persistent objector doctrine gives effect to state sovereignty and provides a mechanism through which states can object to a customary norm preventing the objecting state from incurring any legal obligations once the norm has emerged. The aim of this article is to reflect on whether the persistent objector doctrine could legitimately be used to negate state obligations that would naturally follow from the crystallisation of customary norms in the area of SOGI rights. In this sense the article is both concerned with analysing (not concluding on) current state practice in terms of understanding if and how the persistent objector doctrine is applied, and with gazing forward in terms of analysing whether, if customary law emerges to protect SOGI rights, the persistent objector doctrine could in fact be applied to limit or comprehensively shield states from SOGI-related obligations. This analysis takes place within the framework of the UNHRC Resolution 32/2, which creates an Independent Expert on Protection against Violence and Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and of the responses of the seven African states that provided statements before the UNHRC in the process leading up to this resolution.
Introduction
This article critically analyses the use of the persistent objector doctrine in unilaterally challenging the validity of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 1 (SOGI) rights and related state obligations. The persistent objector doctrine provides a mechanism through which states can object to a customary norm, and it prevents the objecting state from incurring any legal obligations once the norm has emerged. The persistent objector doctrine gives effect to state sovereignty, and must be invoked at the inception of a specific state practice. As Voss points out, "persistent objection or support (eventually) impacts the strengthening or decaying of SOGI rights in international law". 2 However, as argued in this article, the inability of the persistent objector doctrine to account for the universality 3 of human rights law, a principle on which human rights law is founded, limits the influence of this mechanism on SOGI rights.
State practice, recognising SOGI rights in accordance with the Yogyakarta Principles plus 10, 4 for example, is currently increasing, as substantiated in this article, but the state practice of recognising SOGI rights is not yet constant and uniform, and there is undoubtedly state practice that contradicts this development. However, it is not the objective of this article to conclude on whether or not customary international law has developed to protect SOGI rights. That issue has been addressed by other authors with different results. 5 It is rather to reflect on whether the persistent objector doctrine could legitimately be used to negate state obligations that would naturally follow from the crystallisation of customary norms in the area of SOGI rights. In this sense the article is both concerned with analysing (not On the other hand, states accepting SOGI rights often refer to "universal" as the application of existing rights, such as the right to liberty and security of the person, to all human beings. This means that these rights are universal in their application to all human beings including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons. From this perspective universality cannot be garnered from states' practice alone and is importantly no longer controlled solely by state practice. This is what Lau refers to as the human rights regime's "universalist assumption" (further discussed under 4). 8 This assumption is visible for example in article 2 of the UDHR, 9 which refers to " [e] veryone" as entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR "without distinction of any kind".
When evaluating the position of SOGI rights under international law, it is important to acknowledge that neither international nor regional human rights law contains a direct reference to SOGI rights in the same manner for example as the CEDAW 10 (protecting women against gender discrimination), or the CERD 11 (protecting against racial discrimination). Therefore customary international law becomes relevant because as long as there is no direct reference to sexual orientation and gender identity in international treaty law the "universalist assumption", as echoed for example in the UDHR, ICCPR 12 and ICESCR, 13 can be interpreted by state practice as inclusive or exclusive. The development and expression of customary international law becomes relevant, as once a norm of customary international law has developed, it binds all states except persistent objectors.
This article is divided into six parts. Part 2 contextualises the use of the persistent objector doctrine within the context of emerging SOGI rights under customary international law. Part 3 provides a discussion on the different meanings of "universality". Part 4 provides a brief background to the persistent objector doctrine, its mechanics, its functional purposes, and its applicability to international human rights law. Part 5 explores the 8 Lau 2005 Chi J Int'l L 501. 9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR) . 10 Women (1979) (CEDAW).
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) (CERD).
12
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR) . 13 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR).
A RUDMAN PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 5 responses of seven African states to Resolution 32/2 to highlight the practical use of the persistent objector doctrine and arguments centred on "universality". Part 6, the concluding part, argues that the persistent objector doctrine would have no application to SOGI rights under customary international law once crystallised, and suggests how human rights courts could approach the application of the persistent objector doctrine in this regard.
Customary international law, sexual orientation, gender identity and the persistent objector doctrine
The process of establishing customary international law is difficult to delineate and customary norms are therefore often challenged. Dressed in language such as "ripeness" and "maturity", referring to state "practice" and "beliefs", customary international law has mostly been abandoned by states as their preferred source of law governing their relationships with one another. 14 This is particularly true within the domain of international human rights law, where the world has witnessed a proliferation of treaties in the last 60 years. 15 However, in the absence of treaty law the "constant" and "uniform" practice referred to by the 
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Both constant and uniform usage and the persistent objector are discussed in this case.
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ILGA 2016 https://ilga.org/downloads/summary_SOGIESCatUPR_report.pdf; Arc International 2016 http://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/human-rightscouncil/32nd-session-of-the-human-rights-council/appointing-an-independent-experton-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-an-analysis-of-process-results-andimplications/ii-the-process-leading-up-to-the-resolution-2016/. Referring to the over one hundred States from all regions of the world that have made voluntary commitments to address violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in the context of the Universal Periodic Review. More than two thirds of all States that received such recommendations accepted at least one (and often several) such recommendations, indicating that a majority of States welcomes constructive dialogue and has made express commitment to addressing these human rights concerns. Also referred to by the Dutch representative to the UNHRC: ILGA 2016 https://ilga.org/compilation-adoption-2016-sogi-resolution para 3.2.6 statement by the Netherlands, Mr. Roderick Van Schreven -00:33:41.
A RUDMAN PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 6 that states increasingly view SOGI rights as protected under international and regional human rights law can, on the one hand, be explained by states' preference for a teleological interpretation of the ICCPR, for example, as provided for under article 31 of the VCLT. 19 In this regard the direction referred to above draws on the "object and purpose" of the ICCPR, which arguably confirms the universality in application of all human rights. This is established, for example, by the reference in the preamble to the ICCPR to the "inherent dignity of the human person". On the other hand, the direction referred to above can equally be viewed as state practice, inspired by a purposeful interpretation of article 2(1) of the ICCPR, for example. 20
It is a well-established fact under international law that treaty provisions and states' interpretations of their obligations under such provisions may inspire customary international law to develop in a certain direction. Importantly, as expressed in article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, when interpreting a treaty "[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties" should be taken into account, together with the context of the specific treaty. As suggested by Sands, article 31(3)(c) is "available to assist in resolving … conflicts between treaty and custom". 23 It is possible to consider a scenario where the protection of SOGI rights would develop under customary international law to assist a court in interpreting a nondiscrimination clause in a human rights treaty. It is also possible to imagine a scenario where a court, based on state practice alone, could directly apply SOGI protection under customary international law. As expressed in the introduction, the aim of this article is not to pronounce on whether customary international law has developed to protect SOGI rights per se but rather to All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, religious and cultural backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is a duty of States regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
As is evident in both declarations, the universality principle is closely related to the principles of equality and non-discrimination, which are not mutually exclusive. As a basic principle, universality does not consider differences but simply humanity. Therefore, human rights shall have universal application to all. Universality is a concept that Arendt aptly describes as a "right to have rights". 30 The discrimination and equality aspects of human rights have been added to further accentuate the principle of universality. Therefore, human rights shall have universal and equal application to all. This has worked well in terms of highlighting groups of persons in need of specific protection, but has also added a layer of ambiguity, as only certain differences seemingly give rise to protection. This is certainly not in line with the universality principle itself. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has eloquently described the relationship between universality and non-discrimination, emphasising that:
The notion of equality springs directly from the oneness of the human family and is linked to the essential dignity of the individual … Therefore, universality, or the right of everyone to have rights, as expressed by Arendt, 32 is a prerequisite to dignity, which embraces all fundamental human rights.
In the context of SOGI rights the use of the term "universal" can best be described as a slippery slope; where the extra-cultural nature of human rights law, that is, its applicability to all regardless of cultural or religious affiliations or beliefs, is often conflated or replaced by a (mistaken 33 ) requirement of the universal acceptance of SOGI rights. During the voting session at the UNHRC, the representative of the Nigerian delegation, as further discussed under 5, articulated this conflation when he stated that "sexual orientation and gender identity still do not enjoy universal popularity and acceptability to qualify for a human rights issue … the vast majority of nations have not accepted LGBT rights". 34 However, as argued in this article, "universal" signifies that all human rights are attached to all human beings, not accepted by all states at all times. The definition of "universal" in the UDHR means it is not conditional on a widespread acceptance -it is a pre-condition upon which the human rights law regime rests. As such, the core value of the UDHR, for the purpose of the discussion in this article, does not primarily lie in the rights set out, or the non-discrimination clause presented, but in its "universal" application.
The question about the universality of human rights is furthermore intimately linked with the question of which source would create "universality" in application. Arguably, as put forward by D'Amato, customary international law is the only universal international law -as once it has matured, it binds all. 35 The primary question then becomes whether there is enough evidence to conclude that the concept of the "universality" of human rights, as defined above, has emerged as a general principle of international law as referred 32 Rudman 2015 AHRLJ 6. 33 This can be contrasted with the test for customary international law, where, even though the word "universal" often features in the statements of states, there is no need for a practice to actually be "universal". As stipulated by the Special Rapporteur to the International Law Commission on the identification of customary international law, "for a rule of general customary international law to emerge or be identified the practice need not be unanimous (universal); but, it must be 'extensive' or, in other words, sufficiently widespread". to in article 38(b) of the Statute of the ICJ. If it is accepted that at least part 36 of the rights set out in the UDHR have become firmly established as customary international law, the basic principle on which they exist must arguably at the very least be afforded the same status. If this argument is reflected against the discussion in the first report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on jus cogens by the Special Rapporteur on this topic, indicating that the prohibition of torture, slavery, genocide and nondiscrimination have been universally identified as not only part of customary international law but also as jus cogens norms, 37 it would arguably lead to the conclusion that the international community has not only accepted that these rights have gained a sufficiently widespread acceptance (and that there is no valid defence against a violation of these rights), but that the principle underlying these rights -the principle of universality in application -has, at the very minimum, been accepted as a norm under customary international law.
As an example, Yasseen suggested as early as in 1966 that "the concept of jus cogens in international law [is] unchallengeable and … [n]o specialist in international law could contest the proposition that no two States could come to an agreement to institute slavery". 38 As suggested in this article, it follows as a logical outcome of this understanding of the jus cogens nature of slavery that it would be incomprehensible, under international law, to justify the enslavement of a particular human being based on any ground; that is, the prohibition of slavery is based on its universal application to all human beings. If this conclusion is accepted, it remains to be explored whether the persistent objector doctrine can act as a valid defence against any human rights norm. 4 The persistent objector doctrine
The mechanics of the persistent objector doctrine
Until the early 1960s there was no real support for the persistent objector doctrine, as the international community from 1945 onwards consisted of a fairly homogenous set of states, dominated by the power of a handful of central powers. The 1960s and 70s saw the dawn of new African, Asian and Latin-American states through the process of de-colonialisation. The emergence of these new states together with the rise in influence of the Eastern European bloc radically changed the power balance in the international community and upset, as indicated by Weil, the "delicate, indeed, precarious, equilibrium" 39 needed to formulate customary international law. As Western states felt that they were losing control over the formulation of customary international law, led by the United States (US) they introduced the persistent objector doctrine as a response to the fragmentation of customary international law. 40 As mentioned in the introduction, when a legal norm has crystallised into customary international law it is automatically binding on all states. No state can opt out unilaterally. 41 As Schachter explains, if a state were to be allowed to opt out of customary international law based on its own interests, this would amount to a complete denial of the very existence of customary international law. 42 When this is combined with the aspect of the universal application of human rights law, this problem is superimposed.
The formation of customary international law requires that a critical mass of states recognise the norm as compelling law and act on it as such. Customary international law develops over time and it is during the time when the norm is gradually emerging that the persistent objector doctrine may become relevant. Stein indicates that the persistent objector doctrine will find progressively more expression in modern international law because of the rapid formulation of customary international law. 43 a view to what states should do now and in the future". 45 Therefore, the strict examination of state practice has lost its primacy in the methodology of international law and has begun to wither. As succinctly pointed out by Stein:
Correspondingly, opinio juris is no longer seen as a consciousness that matures slowly over time (and finally imparts obligatory force to a practice once motivated by habit, convenience, or moral sentiment), but instead as a conviction that instantaneously attaches to a rule believed to be socially necessary or desirable. 46 In basic terms, the persistent objector doctrine operates under five main conditions. Firstly, the state must start objecting to the rule as the rule emerges -and it must continue to do so. The objection can take different forms and take place in different forums. As explained by Dumberry, an objection can include:
[S]tatements made during treaty negotiations, pleadings before national and international tribunals, voting and statements at international conferences, diplomatic communications, the promulgation of national laws, statements and reservations made when signing/ratifying treaties, etc. 47 Secondly, there must be clear evidence of the objection. Thirdly, the objecting state must refute any assumption of acceptance of the rule. Fourthly, silence or failure on behalf of the objecting state is interpreted as acceptance. Finally, objections must be consistent over time and the state must invoke its objection whenever it is relevant. 48 However, as concluded by Lau, even though these are the conditions for a successful application of the persistent objector doctrine, the definition of an "objection" and the "consistency" thereof are unsettled issues under international law. 49 There are less than a handful of cases where international forums have dealt with these issues. In the only available human rights case, Michael Domingues v United States, 52 the Inter-American Commission (IACom) gave the application of the persistent objector doctrine a nod of approval. In this case the US raised the persistent objector doctrine as a defence against allegations that its use of the juvenile death penalty violated customary international law. In the end, the IACom asserted that the persistent objector doctrine was an ineffective defence to the use of the death penalty for juveniles per se, as this norm had reached the status of jus cogens. 53 However, it confirmed that in its opinion the persistent objector doctrine may be raised as a defence against the application of a human rights norm. It is important to point out that it is mainly the US that has supported and insisted on the validity of the persistent objector doctrine in this context and that this decision has not been confirmed by any other regional or international court since 2002. 54
The application of the persistent objector doctrine in the domain of human rights law
The persistent objector doctrine has received extensive critique in terms of its application as a general defence to a customary international law norm. In summation, this critique has been based on the following grounds: (i) the lack of actual state practice supporting it; (ii) its logical incoherence and its inconsistent application; and (iii) the fundamental challenge it represents to the concept of customary international law. 55 Even though these issues are underlying factors in any critique of the persistent objector doctrine, this part will essentially focus on the critique levelled against the application of the persistent objector doctrine specifically within the domain of international human rights law. It is worth noting, however, as a point of departure, that "no tribunal has ever ruled that the status of persistent objector prevented the application of a norm of customary law to the objecting State" and as such it can be concluded that even though it is utilised by states it is still a fictive defence. Regarding the role of the persistent objector doctrine in preserving state dissent, there are several examples that lead to the conclusion that consent in modern international law plays a diminishing role. The emergence of universal jurisdiction over certain crimes, the fact that the consent of the new states created after the period of de-colonialisation was not sought in terms of the already existing international standards and the growing support for different types of interventions in the sovereign affairs of states all point in this direction. 57
Arguing as a positivist and demonstrating the existence of universal human rights by noting the acceptance and ratification of human rights instruments by a vast majority of states regardless of their cultural background, the most important contribution of Lau 58 is the notion of what he refers to as "original consent". As said under 3 above, the main assumption supporting the international human rights law regime is the notion of universality, and as suggested by Lau:
The UDHR and the Vienna Declaration embody states' informal consent to the inextricable universality of human rights law. Participation in the UN human rights regime -which grew out of the UDHR -should itself be considered an informal expression of consent to the regime's underlying assumption of universalism. This idea fits well with the argument presented under 3 above, that the core value of the UDHR is not primarily the rights but its "universal" application. As such, it must be accepted that as at least part of the rights set out in the UDHR (as further argued above under 3) have become firmly established as customary international law, the basic principle in terms of which they exist must at the very minimum be afforded the same status. Tied in with the idea of original consent, this would yield the result that "if a state participates in the UN human rights regime but later requests to excuse itself from a specific human rights [norm] because of its objections during the specific law's emergence, that request should be refused". 60 Principles of consent are not violated, because the state had already consented to the universal application of all human rights to all human beings.
Regardless of whether the universality of human rights is viewed from the position of "original consent", as expressed by Lau, or as an unequivocal precondition to any or all human rights, as suggested under 3, the end result is the same. The idea that the universality of human rights is a precondition to the human rights regime is a sine qua non without which this field of law could arguably not exist. Any state that seriously argues against this point would not only violate the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations 61 but would also, in repudiating its support for this pre-condition, have to distance itself from the entire human rights law regime. It is worrying but evident from the discussion under 5 below that such threats are being made.
The second function of the persistent objector doctrine is that it gives states the opportunity to predict their legal obligations under customary international law. As mentioned above, customary international law develops over time, sometimes in an imprecise fashion. This arguably makes it hard for states to ascertain when customary international law has ripened; that is, when states must start complying with the norm. However, this purpose is rapidly becoming less and less significant, as international human rights litigation is becoming more and more frequent. 62 prohibiting and punishing all forms of violence including those targeting persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender identities, ensuring proper investigation and diligent prosecution of perpetrators, and establishing judicial procedures responsive to the needs of victims. 80 This approach to SOGI rights has further been confirmed by the AComHR in its joint dialogue with the IACom on Human Rights and the UN under the theme of Ending violence and other human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 81 In this regard it is essential to note that the AComHR, in performing both a protective and a promotional mandate under article 45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), refers in Resolution 275 to article 2 (non-discrimination), article 3 (the equal application of the law), article 4 (respect of their life and the integrity of the person) and article 5 (the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment) in promoting the universal application of the ACHPR. The AComHR has also in two decisions on individual complaints 82 (albeit obiter) and a number of concluding observations 83 referred to sexual orientation as a prohibited ground. It further confirmed this position in its General Comments on article 14 (1)(d) The jurisprudence and decisions of the regional judicial and quasi-judicial bodies as well as the persuasive statements of all the major UN treaty bodies amount to a clear sign that SOGI rights are grounded in the universal application of human rights. Therefore, if universality is the point of departure for the protection of all human rights, SOGI rights included, and the concept of universality forms part of customary international law and as such cannot be re-negotiated to embrace only certain human beings and certain rights, where does that leave the persistent objector doctrine? This question is explored in more detail below.
The African voice at the UNHRC
This part aims to analyse the statements of the seven 86 African states that made submissions during the voting procedure before the UNHRC in relation to Resolution 32/2. The objective of this section is to highlight the misconception of the universality argument as set out under 3, the cultural relativist approaches that feed into this misconception, and the use of the persistent objector doctrine as set out under 4, in this context.
It is important to point out that the statements analysed below do not reflect the full spectrum of the relevant states' policy, neither on human rights law in general nor specifically regarding SOGI rights. Nevertheless, the submissions related to below shed some light on the varying positions of these states on SOGI rights and on the very practical way in which the persistent objector doctrine is engaged.
Establishing an Independent Expert on SOGI rights
As mentioned in the introduction, the main objectives of Resolution 32/2 are to reaffirm that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR. Flowing from this objective it also aims to confirm that acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against we are talking about the universality, when the common ground between human civilizations is achieved, whereas today we are facing a draft resolution that is against the values and the beliefs of at least 1.5 billion that belong to one civilization". 95 The Nigerian delegation furthermore noted that "this resolution will not serve any useful purpose for the vast majority of States that don't believe in it". 96 It is evident from the statements quoted above that the battle over SOGI rights centres on the "correct" definition of "universal", which in itself is deeply ironic. Furthermore, when they demonstrated their opposition to Resolution 32/2, it is evident that the proponents for the no-vote were also prepared to link the disregard for the universality of human rights law to the fundamental structures not only of the UNHRC but also the broader international community. As an example, in the statement by the representative of the Moroccan delegation the vote on Resolution 32/2 was referred to as "a very dangerous turning point" and the "beginning of a very dark period in the life of the Council where two-thirds of humanity and humankind will feel that they are outside the Council", 98 whereas the Nigerian representative referred to the vote as polarising. 99
5.3 Ghana, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana -accepting the development of SOGI rights under customary international law?
While the Nigerian, Moroccan and Algerian statements are interesting from the perspective of invoking the persistent objector doctrine, using universality and consent as primary arguments, the positions of Ghana, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa all present interesting shifts, in one way or another, from the positions these states previously held.
Ghana represents perhaps the most interesting shift. It not only moved from a no-vote in terms of Resolution 17/19 in 2011 to abstaining in 2016, but also clearly acknowledged the development in regional law taking place in this timespan as a major factor contributing to its more positive position on SOGI rights. In his statement, before the final vote on Resolution 32/2, the Ghanaian representative referred to Resolution 275 and took cognisance of the fact that the resolution had been concluded against the background of what the AComHR found to be an alarming incidence of acts of violence, discrimination and other human rights violations that continue to be committed against individuals in many parts of Africa because of their actual or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity. In recognising the development in SOGI protection, the Ghanaian representative made the following statement, succinctly highlighting the tension between the development of customary international law and the domestic position: [W] Rights is in conformity with our Constitution. The laws of Ghana will not permit any individual to be persecuted or assaulted because of their sexual orientation … But Mr. President, this is a very sensitive matter culturally in Ghana. 100 In highlighting the gradual change in Ghana's position, the representative gave the following explanation:
[I]n 2011 Ghana voted against the resolution that has been referred to in the preambular paragraphs. But there has been evolution of thinking, partly because of the Orlando situation, and also because of the resolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. 101 Clearly not prepared to outright contradict what is believed to be the sentiments of the Ghanaian people, which presumably gave rise to the characterisation of the issue as "a very sensitive matter culturally", but cognisant of the development of regional human rights law, Ghana chose not to invoke the persistent objector doctrine. Instead, it referred to an "evolution in thinking" which could be viewed as an indication of its perception of the development of customary international law in this regard.
The South African position represents a step in a different direction, although it also abstained from voting in the final round. Importantly, South Africa, as the main sponsor, directed the UNHRC to adopt Resolution 17/19, the first SOGI resolution in the history of the UNHRC. Equally, in 2012, in response to a motion from the United Arab Emirates to remove the terms "sexual orientation and gender identity" from the General Assembly Resolution on Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 102 South Africa voted for retaining the SOGI reference. 103 Finally, in 2014, when the UNHRC adopted Resolution 17/32, South Africa was the only African state to vote for the resolution and consequently against the seven hostile amendments that preceded the final vote. 104 Against this background it is interesting to analyse the 2016 response from the South African delegation to Resolution 32/2. From its previous actions and statements it was quite clear that it had accepted and in fact spearheaded the development of customary international law in this regard. This position overall was built on the domestic legal position where discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited. 105 For this reason the statement made by South Africa that "while [it] supported those parts of this resolution which focus primarily on ending violence and discrimination against LGBTI persons, [it] cannot support this resolution as it stands and will therefore abstain" raised serious concerns about its SOGI commitments. 106 The reasons provided had nothing to do, it seems, with its legal obligations or its policy position in this regard, but rather with the manner in which the sponsors approached the resolution. This is clearly reflected in the statements of the South African representative to the effect that "[g]randstanding, recklessness, brinkmanship and point-scoring will not take us anywhere" and "[h]ow the current sponsors have sought to build on the South African initiative of 2011, has added divisive dimensions and created unnecessary acrimony in this Council". 107
Although it is not possible to confirm definitively why South Africa left the core group sponsoring the previous SOGI resolutions, Voss 108 suggests that domestic politics and regional pressure contributed the most to South Africa's decision to shift positions on SOGI. The South African approach is an interesting example as South Africa seems to be in complete agreement with the point of introducing this resolution and the fact that customary international law is developing towards consistent SOGI protection. It recognises its domestic obligation towards upholding SOGI rights, as reiterated in the statements before the UNHRC with reference to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). South Africa also confirms the position of the AComHR, that "no persons should be subjected to discrimination and violence on any ground including on the basis of sexual orientation". 109 From this perspective, it is difficult to understand its opposition to a resolution that carries exactly the same message. 
